Rebuilding Hezbollah

 

The dead of south Lebanon watch the living from the sides of buildings, from lampposts and even strung between streets on wires, their faces staring bravely from posters, their heads superimposed onto the bodies of generic men in uniform. These are Hezbollah’s martyrs; men killed fighting against Israel’s occupation of the south prior to the withdrawal in 2000 or, more recently, in the numerous cross-border clashes that culminated in the summer war of 2006.

 

Each of Lebanon’s political parties and militias mourn their dead in a similar way – posters, funerals and emotional rhetoric – but the images take on a special significance for Hezbollah, as the posters with the photographs and real names might be the only public acknowledgement of the individuals that make up this most secretive of institutions: Hezbollah’s professional military wing. 

 

According to members inside the group, as well as outside observers, Hezbollah has embarked on a major expansion of its conventional fighting capabilities. It is now sending hundreds, if not thousands, of its members, allies and new recruits to a series of training camps in Lebanon, Syria and Iran to prepare for yet another war with Israel that Hezbollah fighters eagerly anticipate with a smile and the phrase “God willing.” 

 

But what is becoming more obvious even as Hezbollah tries to conceal it, is the group has embarked on a unprecedented build-up of men, equipment and bunker building in preparation for the war almost everyone – Lebanese and Israeli – considers nearly inevitable. “The villages in the south are empty of men,” according to one international official, who spends much of his time in south Lebanon. “They are all gone, training in Bekaa, Syria and Iran.”

 

Hezbollah members say that the initial training and selection of Hezbollah recruits is done in Lebanon, with Iran preferred for training on special skills – use of certain rockets, weapons, RPGs, and anti-tank missiles. “But mostly the training in Iran is in theoretical things: philosophy, religion,” says another Hezbollah fighter. “The best training for fighting is done here in Lebanon. We are so close to Israel here that our training becomes real. You have to move silently, find your coordinates, and complete your mission. You’re practicing on the same ground you will fight on with the enemy nearby. This cannot be done in Iran.”

 

A Lebanese security official adds that Hezbollah’s famed counter-intelligence services train in espionage and surveillance alongside Iranian security services. Israeli official statements imply the increasingly aggressive recruiting results from the heavy casualties suffered by the group in the 2006 war, a notion dismissed by sources within Hezbollah and even by a recent “white paper” on the conflict commissioned by the US military. While Israel publicly contends between 500 and 700 Hezbollah fighters were killed, the group itself publicly announced the deaths of about 80 fighters in a series of funerals after the war. Within the group, sources admit that the losses were roughly double that figure, while the US military study deciding that Hezbollah lost 184 fighters.

 

“You can be told to sit on a hill for seven days and not to move once or be seen. My friend was told this and when he asked what he should eat, his commander handed him seven Snickers Bars. The most important thing is to complete the mission you are assigned in the way you were told to do it. But if you must do it another way (than ordered), it can be okay but you must make sure you are right before you break orders. But we are trained to know when it is okay and when it is not.”

 

Hezbollah fighters describe a series of units, built around specialties such as rocket teams, heavy weapons specialists, infantry, scouts and counter-intelligence. The recruits operate on a full time or part time basis. “Some units will be sent for training or operations for one, even two, years. Others continue to work or go to school. But even if you work, your life is still Hezbollah. They call and that’s it – you go. Maybe you have to tell your boss or professors you’re going to Qatar or something for family or business. But you never tell anyone what you’re really doing.”

 

Full-time fighters are deployed wherever they’re required, the remaining units are built around where the fighters live. The fighters in Bint Jbeil, for instance, are almost always from that town, exploiting the local understanding of the terrain and helping the operatives keep a low profile.

 

A Lebanese Army commander says Hezbollah’s decision to expand both the military wing and the supporting militias stems not from the losses during the 2006 war, but rather from Hezbollah’s success as a conventional military force in it. “They shocked Israel by standing and fighting from fixed positions. Even badly outnumbered, they were able to hold territory with minimal losses even under assault from tank units,” he says. “Now they want to expand to make sure they can stop the next invasion before the tanks reach the flat plains of the Bekaa, where Israel’s armored units will have the advantage (compared to the rocky hills of southern Lebanon).”

 

“Israel will always be their main focus,” says the Army officer. “But they have access to many young men who are good enough to fight with rocks, sticks and maybe some guns. Basically, they’re training those guys to fight the Sunnis in Beirut.” 

 

One Hezbollah admits that further civil conflict is a distinct possibility, which makes the Hezbollah build-up even more troubling. “If that happens,” he insists, “it will have been forced on us. God willing, I will never fight a Lebanese. But I will if ordered.”